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Abstract  Complexity is a purposeful integrating framework for 
interdisciplinary dialogue, namely between sociologists and economists. After 
presenting some properties of complex (social) systems, we consider the crucial 
role of the economic complexity research agenda in challenging the mainstream 
economic paradigm. This endeavor, we suggest, can greatly benefit from a 
neglected but relevant aspect, the concern regarding social complexity implicit 
in the sociological tradition, particularly the emphasis given by Durkheim to the 
idea of interdependence, a keystone of complexity studies nowadays. As we 
underline, instead of assuming interdependence/complexity and 
autonomy/simplicity in a tradeoff relationship, the French sociologist takes 
interdependence and autonomy as fundamentally complementary and positively 
correlated characteristics of modern societies. This fact suggests the 
convenience to conceptualize complexity as a broad socioeconomic, and not just 
a strict economic, phenomenon. Such a purpose is certainly more damaged than 
benefited by the existence of the economics/sociology academic divide.  
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Socioeconomic Complexity and the Sociological 






This paper is about the meaning and importance of the notion of socioeconomic 
complexity as a purposeful integrating framework for interdisciplinary dialogue 
between sociologists and economists.   
Originating in the physical and biological sciences (at least in terms of its 
explicit consideration), the notion of complexity has extended to several branches of 
social and human sciences, namely economics and sociology. Interdisciplinary by its 
inherent nature, the economic content of this notion may well be enriched by certain 
intellectual facets belonging to the sociological tradition. Such plausible examples 
include: a) the changing forms of preserving solidarity within the social division of 
labor context, b) the theoretical possibilities and limitations of the community-society 
antinomy, c) problems emerging from social differentiation and their relationship with 
increasing moral individualism, d) problematic articulations within the pair of trends 
formed by social differentiation and social inequalities.  
A number of these issues, as recently considered in economic theory, to some 
extent overlap with fields of interest typical of long-established sociological 
obsessions. However, there are also important differences between the economic and 
sociological approaches to complexity, mainly originating in the specific ways the 
forma mentis of each one, as well as the corresponding intellectual toolkits, are 
produced within the respective academic fields.  
Both the differences and the overlapping elements are to be highlighted in this 
paper. The main points here are: a) whereas in economics complexity is a challenging   3
novelty, very much questioning the physics-inspired assumptions of traditional 
mainstream discourse, in sociology it seems to be an ever present (if not explicit) and 
crucial element of analysis; b) whereas in economics the relationship between 
interdependence and autonomy is typically thought of as a tradeoff one, in 
Durkheim’s sociology it is mostly considered in terms of reciprocal propitiation and 
reinforcement. At any rate, so we think, the concept of interdependence, a keystone of 
complexity studies, might well create a very interesting scope for dialogue between 
sociologists and economists. 
The paper is organized as followed. After briefly discussing the difficult task of 
defining complexity in a general sense and resuming some important properties of 
complex (social) systems, it points out the crucial role of the economic complexity 
research agenda in challenging the mainstream economic paradigm, to which it is not 
yet but may eventually represent a solid alternative (section 2). In the third section, a 
contribution is made towards uncovering a neglected but relevant aspect of 
complexity in broad terms, that is, the implicit concern with social complexity 
adopted by the sociological tradition and particularly in Durkheim’s work, mostly 
associated with the fact that Durkheim treats interdependence and autonomy as 
positively correlated and logically reinforcing traits of modernity. Section 4 concludes 
by discussing some potential connections between the economic and sociological 
approaches to complexity that seem to open up a promising interdisciplinary research 
agenda on the important notion of socioeconomic complexity, and in addition it 
identifies certain constraints on progress. 
   4
COMPLEXITY IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Complexity is indeed a concept with a great variety of meanings and a great 
number of definitions. Without any intention of exhausting the subject
2, and for 
instance we may refer to computational complexity, which according to Gell-Mann 
(1995) is concerned with how long it takes a standard universal computer to perform a 
particular task. We can also take the more common concept that (again in Gell-
Mann's view) relates complexity to the length of a concise description of any given 
entity (Gell-Mann and Lloyd, 1996). Macro-social systems are certainly complex in 
this latter sense.  
After considering complexity as a key characteristic both of the world we live in 
and of the way we perceive it, and notably the socio-economic world, Delorme (2001) 
presents the broadly shared following notion: a system is complex when it cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by a mere understanding of its component parts. 
Along the same lines Durlauf (2003) considers that a system is said to be 
complex when it exhibits some type of order as a result of the interactions of many 
heterogeneous objects. Such systems display and may be appropriately identified by 
the following properties: nonergodicity, phase transition, emergent properties and 
universality.  
The emergence of structures and the unfolding of patterns result in viewing the 
economy as process dependent, organic and evolving rather than deterministic, 
mechanistic and predictable. An interesting example (see Arthur et al, 1997) is the 
                                                             
2 As noted by Horgan (1997, p. 305), a well-known sceptic about the complexity approach to 
economics, Seth Lloyd has gathered at least 45 definitions of complexity. For a contrary, more 
sympathetic position, see Rosser (1999).   5
functioning of stock markets in which booms and crashes in prices are a frequent 
feature resulting from rule-of-thumb behavior interacting to determine individual 
purchasing decisions. The crucial forces leading to economic complexity of this kind 
are interactions and positive feedbacks between individual actors, conceptualized as 
decision makers whose choices depend directly on the decisions of others.  
Interactions between large numbers of parts create a state of affairs that is not 
easily describable unless we resort to aggregation methods that in most cases are 
clearly unsatisfactory (for a discussion about the problems of aggregation and 
dynamic systems see Shpak et al. 2003). 
A heuristic conjecture can be derived from the above definitions of complexity: 
a dynamic social system that is more complex as a static set of interactions is not only 
more complex in the Gell-Mann sense but probably also more complex in the 
dynamic sense (Amaral, 1999). This is only a heuristic proposition that may prove 
useful in social system analysis (for its application in an input-output context, see 
Amaral et al. 2007). 
If we accept this conjecture, the study of patterns and of the interactive intensity 
between the parts of a system represents an important issue within complexity since it 
helps in understanding the dynamic system behavior. This conjecture fits perfectly 
with one of the most well known definitions of complexity: a system is complex when 
it is characterized by process and emergence in which components adapt to the world, 
that is, the aggregate pattern they co-create: as elements react, the aggregate changes, 
as the aggregate changes, elements react anew (Arthur 1999). Although our purpose 
in this paper is not to prove or verify this conjecture, we will however highlight the 
need to qualify it (see infra).   6
Different from mainstream economic theory, with individuals only interacting 
via market clearing prices, the so-called “complexity” view of economics seems to 
accommodate important dimensions long since of central concern  in sociological and 
psychological traditions, for example, conformity effects (“an individual’s perceived 
benefit from a choice increases by the percentage of his or her friends making the 
same choice”) and role model effects (“choices by members of one generation 
influence choices made by the next generation”). As Durlauf (1997) interestingly puts 
it, many of the efforts to introduce more realistic psychology and sociology into 
economic theory operationally are efforts to incorporate positive feedbacks of various 
types.  
Confronting a mainstream approach to economics based on equilibrium, 
optimization, universality and single, narrow disciplinarity, the social interactions 
study of complexity puts emphasis on process, emergence, learning, novelty, 
institutions, organic interdependence, bounded rationality, history, path dependence, 
context, and interdisciplinarity or, as preferred by Rosser (2008), transdisciplinarity. 
Most of these ideas indeed punctuate several previous contributions to the history of 
economics. That they are being brought back into the central stage of this discipline is 
surely good news for alternative strands of evolutionary, institutional and behavioral 
economists, not to mention sociologists and other social scientists. 
In economics, one of the most representative and promising research agendas 
along complexity lines is based on what are termed agent based computational 
economic  models (ACM) exploring the dramatic increase in computer power to 
explicitly deal with the interactions of large numbers of heterogeneous learning agents 
(see, e.g. Colander 2006, Colander et al. 2008 and LeBaron and Tesfatsion 2008).   7
Another interesting agenda is also the “institutional” policy approach, dealing with 
co-ordination problems (Elsner, 2005). 
Henceforth we pursue a different approach, incorporating the value potentially 
added by returning to (and elaborating on) the concerns with complexity implicit in 
the works of the great thinkers of the sociological tradition, particularly Durkheim. 
The keystone idea we underline in this author’s work concerns the fact that, in his 
most famous opera on social division of labor, the French sociologist emphatically 
treats interdependence and autonomy as two reciprocally reinforcing elements, 
whereas in the economic approach to complexity these tend to be assumed in a 
tradeoff relationship. This makes us reconsider Amaral’s heuristic conjecture. In fact, 
a system may reveal a greater dynamic complexity in spite of not verifying a greater 
static complexity, at least in the sense that directly opposes complexity (or 
interdependence) to autonomy. This fact suggests the need to conceptualize 
complexity as a broad socioeconomic, and not just a strict economic, phenomenon.  
 
COMPLEXITY AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 
Complexity as such cannot be said to be a common issue in sociological 
research but that considered by Durlauf (1997), probably one of the first papers on 
economic complexity, is indeed a classic example in sociological literature, namely 
the emergence of racially segregated neighborhoods from a collection of individuals 
with different preferences for community racial composition (Schelling, 1971). 
Another interesting example of socioeconomic complexity is the El Farol Bar 
Problem of Arthur (1994) in which every person must independently decide each 
week whether to show up at their favorite bar according to their prediction of other 
people’s decisions. Also deserving attention are the cascade effects of Granovetter   8
(2003) as well as the agent based computational models of Axelrod (1997), among 
many others. 
Indeed, even without an explicit formulation ─ and that is our main point here ─ 
socioeconomic complexity has long since been a central theme in classical 
sociological thought. Take, as a representative example, the work of Émile 
Durkheim. As is well known and often mentioned, but not always properly 
considered, in what is probably one of the most effective demarches in sociological 
tradition Durkheim (1893) radically changed the adjectives (and implicit evaluations) 
used by Ferdinand Tönnies in his classic antinomy of “community” and “society”, or 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The first, referring to traditional societies, was 
supposed to be connected with Wesenwille, “essential” or “organic” will, whereas 
Gesellschaft, the very essence of modernity, was associated by Tönnies with Kürwille, 
that is, “arbitrary” and “calculative” will. 
The qualification of “organic solidarity” referred to modern societies, with 
“mechanic solidarity” being left to traditional forms of social life, therefore 
corresponded to a drastic move by Durkheim. Among meanings susceptible of being 
attributed to these qualifications, and therefore also to Durkheim’s demarche, it seems 
worth precisely highlighting the awareness that the French sociologist had of the scale 
of increase in complexity associated with the aforementioned change. 
According to Durkheim, let us remember, the idea was to acknowledge not only 
the aspect of spontaneity and normality of the group of processes associated with a 
growing division of labor, but also, and quite importantly, the normality and even 
essential desirability of a crescent dimension of self-consciousness, i.e., reflexivity, 
and individuation in general terms connected with what is usually designated as 
modernity (cf. particularly 1893, Conclusion).      9
These growing individuation and reflexivity, it should be noticed, were thought 
of as simultaneously causes and consequences of a rising interdependence in the parts 
of the social whole, that is, of an equally crescent “moral density” of societies − 
which he of course took the care to consider as a process, without any definable limit, 
and not as any fully consummated reality. 
The simultaneity of these processes of ever growing interdependence and 
individuation/reflexivity would be, and still in accordance with Durkheim, associated 
to undeniable zones (or “moments”, if one chooses to use Hegelian jargon) of tension, 
that is, of tradeoffs in the relations between the two terms, greater individual 
autonomy bringing a looser bond with the social totality, and reversely (idem, Book 
III). But the important trait to underline above all else is that, according to the French 
sociologist, the most fundamental character of the relationship between the two terms 
was not supposed to be that of tradeoff but one of reciprocal reinforcement, a greater 
individuation propitiating in return a greater densification of interdependences. (For 
an essay on the identification of parallelisms between Durkheim’s and Hegel’s works, 
cf. particularly Gangas 2007.)   
In other terms, and as always happens when the cause is effect and the effect 
cause, the growth of social interdependences may well be thought of as a growth in 
social complexity, simultaneously transforming society as a whole and each one of its 
member individuals into intrinsically open-ended realities, escaping from any exact or 
defined determination except precisely the determination of a rising complexification, 
that is to say, somehow (and to now make recourse to another philosophizing jargon) 
“condemned to be free”. 
True, let us repeat, the “moment” of tradeoff is not completely elided. Zones of 
conflict remain and are besides explicitly recognized as such by the French   10
sociologist: possible tedium vitae implied by the “egoism” that moral individualism 
may transport with itself, “anomie” that permanently risks being inserted into the 
growth of personal fulfillment expectations opened up by the very process of 
complexification and its incompleteness. 
Yet, and not least importantly, Durkheim’s deepest persuasion or background 
assumption is that these are two reciprocally reinforcing, and not oppositional, 
processes. It is certain that the variety of individualism expectable in modern 
societies, or capable of being related to a condition of normality, is that of an 
individualism itself already profoundly “moral”, that is to say, object (and besides 
also agent) of a process of modifications that with a certain liberty we may identify 
with what was named by Norbert Elias (1994) as the “civilizing process”. The 
individualism that is characteristic of modern societies, or “organic” solidarity, 
Durkheim insists once and again, is already a moral variety of individualism, by no 
means sheer egoism (which is still identifiable as one of its possible degenerations). 
For the French sociologist, it is therefore not about discovering the 
“spontaneity” of a so-called “inner I” sometimes equivocally identified (following the 
tradition of a certain literary Romanticism) with some pre-social “nature”. 
Acknowledging the importance of the spontaneity, the subjectivity and the “purity of 
intentions” that in general terms were associated with the Kantian tradition of 
philosophical discussion of morality, besides subscribing to positions fundamentally 
susceptible of being considered anti-Utilitarian in matters of moral philosophy (that 
is: asserting the irreducibility of morality to any calculus of utility
3), Durkheim still 
                                                             
3 Although Durkheim disagrees both of Utilitarian and of strictly Kantian notions of morality, he 
clearly rates Kant in a higher level than Utilitarian philosophers (cf. passim Durkheim 1903: 24, 73-
85). The fact that Kant was supposed to be the very example of the philosopher conscious of the basic 
“antinomies” of morality, namely the one opposing autonomy and heteronomy, somehow promotes   11
sustains that the deepest authenticity, clearest conscience and generally speaking 
greatest moral richness supposedly characteristic of modernity are already the result, 
or the cultural deposit, of an entire series of changes of which society was 
simultaneously subject and object, and that we can properly consider as cumulative, i. 
e., as true progress.      
This is, besides, a matter sufficiently rich in implications to justify a 
comparison, however brief, with another tutelary figure from the sociological 
tradition. We are referring to Max Weber, to whom, as is well known, the full set of 
processes usually associated with the sedimentation of modernity was supposedly 
identifiable with a loss of “spirituality”, a “disenchantment”, a growing prevalence of 
merely objective trends, a certain form of leveling-by-below of the entirety of 
existence that would also tend to be a suppressor of no matter what kept standing, of 
all that tried to be simultaneously creative and recognized as a distinct reality, 
different from everything else and somehow (maybe inevitably) “above” everything 
else − of all “style”, that is. 
While for Weber the generality of processes associated with modernity, also 
signifying growing social interdependence, were supposed to mostly mean loss of 
soul, “mechanization” (“iron cage”, etc.) and correspondingly also a loss of 
individuality, which is expressed in the famous passage invoking Goethe and the 
alleged contemplative wisdom and “renunciation” vis-à-vis the presumed tragic 
inevitability of the prevalence of professional ethics and specialization (cf. 
particularly Weber 1983: 180-1), for Durkheim, we may say, the historic rise of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
him to the position where Durkheim suggests the need for an insurmountably “religious” element in 
social life, society obviously being the very focus of that element, as he sustains in his late work Les 
Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse (1912). 
   12
figure of the Berufsmensch lies very far from expressing any threat to the Mensch, 
rather on the contrary. To tell the complete truth, we must acknowledge the fact that 
Durkheim also insists on the necessity of a moral discipline and a moral education 
capable of forming men and citizen apt to take up professional positions and seek 
their self-fulfillments while professional, and therefore in a sense limited, self-
fulfillments (cf. Durkheim 1903: 34 and seq., 177 and seq.; 1922: 4-5, 37 and seq.). 
However, what is central is that according to Durkheim this trait is closely associated 
with, and indeed to a large extent is the same as, the process via which both society 
and individuals obtain greater “moral density”. Hence, if it may occasionally make 
sense to think of the two terms (moral enrichment of society and individuals) in a 
tradeoff type of relationship, the deepest connection between the two is no doubt one 
of mutual reinforcement. 
On the basis of these different (and to some important aspects even fully and 
directly contrary) readings of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, there is 
understandably also a non despicable set of differences in terms of doctrinaire 
leaning, with political ramifications that would be foolish to duck. Behind Weberian 
cogitations, it is probably not so much Goethe who shows up, rather Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche with the correlate beliefs concerning the leveler (and nullifying) effect 
of the rising predominance of professional ethics (cf. Losurdo 2004: 133-50, 215-24) 
− unless, of course, a group of elite beings could oppose this “going-Chinese” trend in 
a campaign of regeneration and self-transcendence capable of somehow identifying 
them with their most profound calling, or rather with the correspondent variety of that 
“group of instincts we call «life»” (Nietzsche 1973: Chapter Nine, aphorism 258), 
aiming precisely at a fully accomplished existence, explicitly thought of as excess, 
luxus, absence of any purpose other than the so to speak self-purpose and consciously   13
placed over and above a multitude of men-of-profession with these, on the contrary, 
fundamentally hetero-oriented and hetero-justified. 
Essentially different were the doctrinaire horizon and political orientations of 
the French republican clerc Émile Durkheim. Not only does he take division of labor 
as associated with crescent individualism and moral densification, these are in turn 
distinguished from social inequality with Durkheim taking pains to warn of looming 
dangers of “anomic” and “forced” divisions of labor. In practice, considering both the 
problems of social inequalities and the currents of socialist thought responding, 
Durkheim went quite far in acknowledging the need for broader state intervention in 
the economy as a safeguard of both individual liberties and fair equality of 
opportunities. The state was for him the expression of society’s conscience and will, a 
true “collective ego” (cf. Giddens 1971: 98-100), and his motives for parting from the 
contemporaries streams of socialist thought lay mostly in the fact that these were 
allegedly not only the expression of the “cult of the individual” (which was 
supposedly a good thing: the strength of the state as a guarantee of the liberty of each 
and all), but also of the Utilitarian variety of individualism, and actually egoism, 
which was most typical of the economist’s frame of mind. Therefore, and according 
to Durkheim, his contemporary socialists were not equipped with an intellectual 
package capable of an in-depth challenge to the dominant “egoistic” world-views only 
able to be transcended through a strong emphasis on moral education and a 
rehabilitation of professional associations (Giddens, 1971: 101-4, 115-8, 224-32). 
  But the most important facet to underline here is how Durkheim’s particular 
interpretation (and evaluation) of the so-called Bildung’s tradition, now explicitly 
conceived as a simultaneously professional and integral “formation of the individual”,   14
also expresses, perhaps because “each man is Humanity”, the core of his thought 
concerning the evolution of the whole of society:       
a) During his process of self-civilization, each individual undergoes a set of 
transformations that can properly be conceptualized as growing complexification: he 
gets integrated into an ever tighter fabric of interdependences, which in the meantime, 
far from engulfing him or threatening him while a distinct reality, actually leads him 
to an ever more acute awareness of precisely that uniqueness.  
b) On the other hand, if truly he gets parted from the naturalist predominance of 
instincts or sensibility, at the same time his increasingly moral nature induces in him 
the ascendancy of another kind of sentiments with which he tends to identify himself, 
or more precisely to identify his “deepest I”, clearly thought of and experienced as a 
superior or “transcendental I”. This thereby also boosts, so to speak, the density of 
subjectivity associated with existence, notwithstanding the noticeable fact that these 
sentiments are indeed, according to Durkheim, one of society’s multiple avatars. 
c) Finally, if growing social differentiation implies for certain aspects a 
dimension including the production of inequalities, at the same time for other aspects 
it induces a reduction of inequalities. More importantly, these inequalities tend to be 
accepted only inasmuch as they are recognized as intrinsically moral, that is to say, 
fundamentally dependent on the achievement and merit of each individual, 
measurable according to objective, universal criteria, and not on factors such as 
circumstances of birth, whims of Lady Luck, and in general all that might be 
conceived as only fatum: either expression of a “blind”, objective necessity, or as a 
simple “must” paradoxically resultant of an absence of cause, a-caso, randomness − at 
any rate, not a reality provided with moral value, i.e., justifiable by the “General 
Interest” and, in that sense, susceptible of being wanted by the “General Will”.   15
Thereby, each individual’s life tends to be translatable into what one should 
likely call a self-civilizing process, certainly unfinished, obviously facing various 
possible paths of evolution, predominantly identifying itself with the reality of each 
and every one as a conscious subject or “absolute I”, and yet consciously part of a 
wider process, into which he furthermore gets integrated in a potentially (but not 
necessarily) harmonious fashion. There seems to be far less ground for speaking of 
any definite or tragic “renunciation”, as in Weber’s reading of Goethe, since 
modernity is in its final analysis morally richer than previous eras. Instead, the 
German poet insinuates into Durkheim’s work in a rather more prosaic way, since the 
famous Faustian “longing”, or wanting everything and nothing in particular, or more 
precisely inclination to do everything and nothing in particular, is identified by the 
French sociologist with a pathological condition, anomie, not with modernity itself or 
some “modern condition” (cf. Durkheim 1897: 128; 1903: 34, 177).   
Thus, correspondingly, we can even state that society in its whole tends to be 
conceived not as some dead reality but rather somehow as an anima mundi of 
pantheistic inclination, gaining full self-consciousness to the extent that it creates 
itself via conscious human action (for a vision akin to this, but referring it to Hegel’s 
work, cf. Marcuse 1999). The predominance of individuality here is not the opposite 
of holistic leaning, rather these two terms are reciprocally propitious and mutually 
reinforcing.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Socioeconomic complexity: does this concept really hold water? Does it really 
matter? One should first of all mention the existence of what may probably be 
referred to as a diffuse awareness among some prominent economists of a tradition in   16
other social sciences of thinking in terms of complexity, even when that fact is not 
fully and explicitly mentioned or referred to directly as complexity. 
On the other hand, the aforementioned case of Durkheim and the brief contrasts 
with Tönnies and Weber seem to indicate both the evidence of the existence within 
the sociological tradition of plenty of material to provide the basis for a sociologically 
inspired discussion of complexity issues, and also the presence of a number of 
elements that tend to prevent, or at least make it harder, the full recognition of these 
cultural riches and their importance. 
Let us, for a few moments, contemplate on the usual classification of Durkheim 
as a “positivist” sociologist (very often without even a minor qualification of that 
term) in contrast with Weber’s proclaimed “comprehensive” approach to social 
realities before then considering: a) the differences described in their deep mental 
frameworks relating to modernity, moral individualism and professional ethics, b) the 
further divergences in their attitudes towards mainstream (i. e. neoclassical, 
marginalist) economics. As is very well known, not only did Weber ignore and/or 
despise the projects to morally tame economics that Durkheim’s work somehow gave 
rise to (Simiand, Halbwachs, Mauss, etc.), what is more he explicitly and 
emphatically acknowledged the convenience of the academic predominance of 
marginal-calculus-based economics, at least as regards study of the economy, and 
invited other academics to follow his example (for an encomiastic vision of this 
Weberian attitude towards economics, cf. Swedberg 1998). 
To what extend was this rend-Caesar-what-is-Caesar’s position toward 
disciplinary divides itself already suggested by a physics-inspired consideration of 
economic problems? We presumably cannot, alas, but wonder. The undeniable fact is, 
of course, that Weber’s celebrated leaning towards rational indeterminacy (or rather   17
irrational determinacy) of ultimate values, his very much known conflict-of-the-gods 
type of attitude towards “axiological” issues (cf. particularly Aron 1967: 527)
4 
propitiated and indeed enhanced the alleged “value-free” kind of inquiry that still now 
forms the back bone of current, mainstream economics. 
On the other hand, the dominant selective group of readings from the founding 
authors of sociological tradition, still owing much to Talcott Parsons and his 
“classical” interpretations, very much reinforced this attitude of academic disciplinary 
divide, indeed almost schizophrenic separation, which clearly tends to inhibit global 
discussion and understanding of this group of problems (cf. Graça 2005 and 2008).  
Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that the potential continues to exist of a 
cross fertilization of ideas coming from both economics and sociology, and not to 
mention other social sciences, which would likely reconsider some aspects of 
Durkheim’s ideas and the tradition of their appropriation by mainstream sociology, 
somehow integrating the above mentioned ideas in order to result in a new synthesis 
of social theory locating itself under the auspices of the idea of complexity. Through 
to the present day there are underestimated, where not almost unknown or broadly 
misunderstood facets of Durkheim’s work that would be likely to make an excellent 
contribution to that end.       
 
 
                                                             
4 This “agonistic” vision of the “conflict of values”, that is, the idea that values each stand in a quasi 
tradeoff relationship but with no possible universally valid criteria of choice between them, is also 
present in Isaiah Berlin’s notion (1969: 118 and seq.; 1980: 25 and seq.) that an unsolvable conflict 
exists between “ancient” and “modern” notions of liberty, or “pagan” and “Christian” world-views, the 
merit of Machiavelli’s work consisting precisely in highlighting these conflicting aspects. Berlin 
acknowledges that his ideas are largely a tributary of those of Benedetto Croce and Friedrich Meinecke 
on these matters. He could, of course, have also added Carl Schmitt (but did not).   18
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